NAS Panel Stuck On Channel 1, Report Delayed

              PENN JONES T H E
CONTINUING
INQUIRY
VOLUME VI, NUMBERS MARCH 22, 1982
The ancient work will be accomplished from the roof;
Evil rain shall fall on the great man.
Being dead, they will accuse an innocent of the deed;
The guilty one hidden in the misty woods.
—Nostradamus, predicting the Kennedy
assassination and conspiracy in the
16th century.
NAS PANEL STUCK ON CHANNEL 1, REPORT DELAYED by Gary Mack
The NAS Report on the JFK acoustics evidence, just days from release on several occasions, has been delayed
until at least May. Early in February the Panel was presented with evidence that completely shoots down the
main point of the Barber-Vaughan analysis: that the BBN timing of Channel 1 was off by at least 62 seconds
and the 'shot' impulses occurred about one minute after the assassination.
This 'new' evidence is on the Dictabelt, in the BBN Report to the HSCA and now before a very surprised
NAS Panel. It is simple in concept yet devastating in its implications, for it now appears the Dictabelt given to
the HSCA by former DPD officer Paul McCaghren is not the original, but a copy. And on that copy is ex­traneous
audio—the 'Decker transmission.'
In 1980, Steve Barber, brother-in-law of researcher Larry Harris, discovered a transmission on Channel 2 by
iUas County Sheriff Bill Decker that is also on Channel 1. Even though it's just a portion of his full broadcast,
The words '...hold everything secure until the homocide and other investigators can get there' were clear
enough for Steve to conclude the two transmissions were the same broadcast. For the first time, then, the two
channels could be synchronized to each other, something BBN and the HSCA hadn't done (BBN noted the
voice on Channel 1 but didn't consider it important enough to identify who or what was said).
Then, using a stopwatch, Steve found an apparent timing discrepancy which, if confirmed, meant the BBN
analysis and conclusions were totally wrong. Decker's Channel 2 broadcast came 62 seconds after Dallas
Police Chief Jesse Curry's first order 'We're going to the hospital...'. But the same Decker order began on
Channel 1 less than 1. second after the last BBN shot, thereby 'moving' Curry's order 62 seconds before any
shots were fired. With the help of Todd Vaughan and Robert Cutler, further study began.
Eventually, three more Channel 2 transmissions were found on Channel 1, but the last two were in a dif­ferent
open mic sequence. Barber's information was then used as the basis for a high school English class
report by Vaughan, with some graphics assistance by Cutler.
As soon as the Panel obtained the Dictabelt and DPD tape copy, voice prints were made of the Decker
messages. The verdict (recently confirmed by an acoustic scientist I fully trust) was a very high probability
they were identical, and by late summer or early fall 1981, a rough draft of the Report had been prepared. The
unanimous conclusion: the BBN analysis was in error because the impulses thought to have been shots were
unknown noises occurring about one minute after the assassination—total confirmation of the Barber-Vaughan
theory without any other supporting acoustic evidence.
But there were some loose ends and unanswered questions which would have left the Panel vulnerable to
legitimate criticism. Over the following months, in between vacations and work obligations, the rough draft
was revised, sent to the NAS for comment and revised again. Also, consideration was given to the numerous
questions submitted by Paul Hoch, myself and others. The most serious roadblock, though, was the work of
Dr. James Barger and his associates. The methodology was never questioned, and rightfully so, since the
l^|hysics and geometry of the approach had been accepted scientific fact for over 50 years; the specific applica-
^Mi of those principles to the problem was questioned, though, because an error had to have been made
^wnewhere. It was the lack of an acceptable, behevable answer that has held up the Report for so long. No
answer was found, until now.
Sergeant S. Q. Bellah, who had been one of the three advance motorcycle officers riding several blocks ahead
of Chief Jesse Curry's car, radioed in to headquarters on Channel 2 'Do you still want me to hold....'. His call
number, 190, the dispatcher's confirmation and Bellah's question are also heard on Channel 1. Both recor-